Distributed Operations (DO) Update and Way Ahead

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PP&O
26 Feb 07

AGENDA

- **Key Events to Date**
- **DO Concept Development**
- **DO Implementation Accomplishments to Date**
  - *Experimentation*
  - *Manning*
  - *Training*
  - *Equipping*
- **GCE DO Capabilities List Development**
- **Way Ahead**

Key Events to Date

- **<u>March 05</u>: DO Implementation Working Group (DOIWG) established at MCWL to coordinate initial DO effort**
- **<u>April 05</u>: DO Concept Paper approved by CMC**
- **<u>June 06</u>: $198.5M in DO equipment approved via FY-06 Bridge and Main Supplemental**
- **<u>Aug 06</u>: DC, CD&I establishes a DO Transition Task Force (DO TTF) to guide DO capabilities development process**
- **<u>Nov 06</u>: $429M for DO equipment approved in FY-07 Bridge Supplemental.**
- **<u>Dec 06</u>: DC, PP&O approved GCE DO Capabilities List**
- **<u>Jan 07</u>: DC, CD&I published a revision to the Distributed Operations Concept titled: *Marine Corps Operations in Complex and Distributed Environments.***

DO Concept Development

A Concept for Distributed Operations



- **Provides a logical extension of the Marine Corps' maneuver warfare philosophy described in MCDP-1, *Warfighting***

- **Intended to promote discussion and generate ideas for specific combat development initiatives**

Marine Corps Operations in Complex and Distributed Environments


Marine Corps Operations
in Complex and Distributed Environments

11 January 20

or guerrillas; the principle of concentration has to be replaced by that of "fluidity" of force. A
dispersion is also a necessity on the side opposed to the guerrillas, since there is no value in a
success concentration of force against such elusive forces, unable to manœuvre.
Added Hint. Swamy

Introduction to the Problem. The security environment as described by the "Arc of Instability," demands a multi-purpose Marine Corps that is capable of operating with greater autonomy across the spectrum of conflict. Our adversary's approach to warfare, along with the continually increasing lethality of modern weapons, has resulted in us ever increasing need for his dispersion. As stated in Mao's *On Guerrilla Warfare*, "We must make war everywhere and create dispersal of his forces and dissipation of his strength." Commanders are faced with larger "frontages" and complex areas of operation with potentially fewer forces conducting operations. The complexity of the modern operating environment, exacerbated by the presence of civilians and spanning the gamut of conflict, calls for extending the tenets of maneuver warfare through improved tactical decision-making at all levels. Our adversaries:

- Will distribute their operations to exploit our vulnerabilities and indirectly erode our influence.
- Will try to mitigate our advantages by fighting in complex terrain (urban, mountain, jungle).
- Will seek to complicate operations by engaging in war among civilian populations.

Additionally, urban and other environments create situations where units, while not geographically separated, experience relative isolation. There may be another platoon operating across the street but they may as well be in another city. The diversity of threats and activities coupled with relative isolation create the need for autonomy of decision-making and tactical action – even though the forces are not necessarily widely separated.

Small wars "...are usually of longer duration, are often waged in harsh, close terrain, and are characterized by extremes in climate. Additionally, small wars often take place in distant, logistically remote places against elusive opponents about which little is known and who do not fight according to the tactical and operational conventions that are *de rigueur* among modern, mechanized armies: fighting (or hoping to fight) in open country." The enemy is loyal, "...light infantry unencumbered by local terrain and climate and skilled at employing both, and masters of tactics of elusiveness in a manner that serves, substantially to neutralize their "modern" opponents' marked advantages in firepower and technology." These challenges "...place a premium on rigorous physical and psychological conditioning, durable light infantry forces, logistical austerity, small unit cohesion, specialized and exacting training, and decentralized command authority..."

Jeffery Record, *Beyond Military Reform*

- **The subject of considerable debate, study, and concept robust experimentation**

- **Provides greater clarity to the distributed op**

- **Defines Distributed Operations**

- **Announced in MARADMIN 065/07 and will b published in March issue of the Marine Corps**

Distributed Operations Defined

"Distributed operations is a technique applied to an appropriate situation wherein units are separated beyond the limits of mutual support. Distributed operations are practiced by general purpose forces, operating with deliberate dispersion, where necessary and tactically prudent, and decentralized decision-making consistent with commander's intent to achieve advantages over an enemy in time and space. Distributed operations relies on the ability and judgment of Marines at every level and is particularly enabled by excellence in leadership to ensure the ability to understand and influence an expanded operational environment."

- Marine Corps Operations in Complex and Distributed Environments (1/11/07)

Key Take Aways

"There are no Distributed Operations specific units."

"Distributed operations places a premium on the situational awareness and judgment of junior leaders…"

"This does not equate to 'DO Battalions,' but a Marine Corps capable of doing more in irregular complex operating environments while remaining capable of rapidly aggregating for more traditional missions."

-Marine Corps Operations in Complex and Distributed Environments

A Concept for Distributed Operations

"Distributed Operations describes an operating approach that seeks to create an advantage over an adversary through the deliberate use of separation and coordinated, interdependent, tactical actions enabled by increased access to functional support, as well as by enhanced combat capabilities at the small unit level."

A Concept for Distributed Operations (04/25/2005)

- The concept emphasizes the requirement to broaden the skill sets of the Corps' small unit leaders and expand the collective capabilities of small units…by increased access to functional support.



Key Take Aways (continued)

- Distributed operations endeavors to match capabilities with challenges – at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

- Wider distribution of our forces tactically, operationally and strategically is an imperative based on our interests, the threat, and the nature of the modern battlefield.

- The requirement to push functions down to a lower level (fires, C2, tactical mobility, scalable logistics) is driven by the need to disperse / disaggregate our forces to achieve

The concept emphasizes the requirement to broaden sets of the Marine Corps' small unit leaders and expa collective capabilities of small units.



DO Challenges at the Strategic Level

Preponderance of currently deployed:

-- Ground Forces -- Special Operations Forces

-- Deployed ISR -- Forward Deployed Naval Expeditionary Forces



DO Challenges at the Strategic Level

Risks
• Fighting a global war with sub-regional application of resources
• Provides opportunities for terrorists in the 'coldest corner of the room'
• Competitors have freedom of action
Opportunity Costs
• Inability to conduct shaping operations
• Inability to reinforce / strengthen regional partners
• Failure to expand influence / modify behavior
Focus Areas
Traditional
Emerging
Strategic Risk / Opportunity Costs

DO Challenges at the Operational Level

Beirut, Lebanon:
November 1982

24th Marine Amphibious Unit:

The mission required the 24th MAU to occupy positions in the vicinity of Beirut International Airport and establish and maintain close continuous liaison with the French, Italian, and Lebanese forces.





STRAIGHT LINE DISTANCES

MAHMUDIYAH TO

BAGHDAD	**17 KM**
ABU GHURAHYB	**29 KM**
FALLUJAH	**61 KM**
HILLAH	**64 KM**

ISKANDARIYAH TO

BAGHDAD	**45 KM**
ABU GHURAYB	**52 KM**
FALLUJAH	**74 KM**
KARBALA	**35 KM**
HILLAH	**43 KM**

KALSU TO

BAGHDAD	**52 KM**
ABU GHURAYB	**60**

editionary Unit AO: Jul 04-

August 2004 SIGACTS



- **TF 2/2 RR Bridge Repair Security Mission (4-15 Aug)**
- **24 MEU Assumes AO from RCT-1B**
- **Operational Focus: CM**

DO Challenges at the Tactical Level

TIME TO TRAIN is the greatest challenge:

- **Within formal school curricula**
- **Within Pre-deployment training continuum (1:1.5 deployment to dwell ratio)**
- **Within manpower management system (e.g., Rating, Key Billets, TIS/TOS constraints)**

Raising the Bar:

- **Employment of supporting arms**
- **Comand & Control**
- **Logistical Sustainment**
- **Battlespace Awarenes**
- **Communications**
- **New equipment**
- **Force Protection**
- **Leadership/Decision making**

DO Implementation Accomplishments

Experimentation (MCWL)

Training (TECOM)

Manning (M&RA)

Equipping (MCSC)

Experimentation

- **Executing robust DO experimentation program.**
- **DO Experimentation Objectives:**
  - **Develop and assess DO-related tactics, techniques and procedures**
  - **Examine issues critical to the integration of tactical level DO in higher headquarters planning.**
  - **Evaluate current and prototype equipment for DO**
  - **Identify DO training and manpower requirements**

- **<u>Nov 05</u>: Limited Objective Experiment (LOE-1) (Platoon from 1/3)**
- **<u>May 06</u>: Limited Objective Experiment (LOE-2) (Platoon from 1/5)**
- **<u>Oct 06</u>: Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) completed w/ 1/5 and 31st MEU in the Republic of the Philippines**

Manning

Personnel Policies that Enhance DO Capa

• Established benchmarks to improve unit stabilization dates in order to:

- Ensure key personnel availability
- Maximize military schools attendance
- Enable participation in full pre-deployment training program

• Improved infantry battalion stabilization from D-90 to D-150 for all deploying battalions – a 66% increase in unit stabilization time.

• Goal is a universal stabilization date of D-180 for all deploying infantry battalions (OIF/OEF/MEU) NLT Jan 08. Once achieved, this will constitute a 100% increase in unit stabilization time.

Training

Brilliance in the Basics…

- **Infantry Battalion Enhancement Period Program (IBEPP) is key DO Enabler**:
  - Tactical Small Unit Leaders Course (TSULC) to enhance fire team leader training
  - Train the Trainer (T3) Course to better develop operating force skills in training Marines
- **Raising the bar in Infantry Small Unit Leader Courses with updated/complimentary Programs of Instruction (POIs), new equipment, and increased staffing.**
- **Infantry Squad Leader Course – Increased # of courses at SOI (60% increase in annual throughput)**
- **Infantry Unit Leader Course (Plat Sgt) – Increasing # of TEMINs students (PCS enroute) to fill school seats**

Equipping

- **Jun 06- New Inf Bn T/E approved to include DO additive items.**
- **Received funding for (35) Inf Bn worth of DO additive equipment in FY-06 and FY-07 Supplementals.**
- **Received funding in FY07 Bridge Supplemental ($166M) for TECOM additional equipment to better enable training to include IBEPP.**
- **Jan 07 – Equipment sourcing conference for stand up of 1/9, 2/9 & 3/9.**
- **I&L(LF) has initiated a Facilities Assessment to determine impacts of the DO additive items on new T/E.**
- **Note: Current 202K End Strength IPT has addressed the structure for 19 additional personnel to Inf Bn T/O to support new Inf Bn T/E.**

GCE DO Capability List Methodology



CONCEPT

Mission Analysis

- Specified Tasks
- Implied Tasks

Fires
Maneuver
Intel / BA
Logistics
C2
FP

CAPABILITY

GCE Advocate's Capability List

Fires
Maneuver
Intel / BA
Logistics
C2
FP

OCC FIELD & LEVEL

GCE Organizational Level

Battalion
Company
Platoon
Squad

Note: "Additive capability" defined as either a new capab
an existing capability that is moved to a lower organizatio

DO Capability List Development

- Developed by GCE Operational Advisory Groups (Oct 06)

- Organized by the six warfighting functions

- Reviewed and approved by DC, PP&O (Dec 07)

- DC, CD&I has directed that further DO

h

Note: The GCE DO Capabilities list is intended to serve as a

baseline for further defining additive capabilities required to

support DO implementation across the MAGTF.

Maneuver

DO Mission Analysis:

- **Units will require organic surface mobility to move rapidly and maintain positional advantage relative to the enemy or enhance force protection measures.**
- **Units will disperse beyond the normal range of mutually supporting organic direct fires.**
- **Units will require the ability to rapidly re-aggregate and mass combat power.**
- **Conduct mobility and counter-mobility operations down to the smallest DO capable unit.**

Associated Additive Capabilities:

- **The ability to disaggregate, operate, and re-aggregate in all littoral and riverine environments. (New capability for Bn to Sqd levels)**
- **The ability to detect mines, IEDs, UXO and Enemy Ammunition Caches (Ensured Mobility). (New capability for Bn to Sqd levels)**
- **The ability to neutralize mines, IEDs and UXO (Ensured Mobility). (Existing capability pushed to the Plt & Sqd levels)**

DO Way Ahead

- **DO TTF continues to steer DO Capabilities development and synchronization with POM-10 FEA timeline and development of the MAGTF Requirements List.**
- **DO TTF continues to guide IBEPP planning, implementation, and sustainment until the program reaches full maturity.**
- **DO TTF & the Strategic Ground Equipment Working Group (SGEWG) continue to refine equipment sourcing plan.**
- **CDD/MCSC/ONR continue S&T initiatives in support of DO capabilities development.**
- **MCWL continues aggressive experimentation plan.**

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE CORPS COMBAT
DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
SEMPER PROGREDI

Backups

Fires

DO Mission Analysis:

- **Small, highly trained units capable of employing the full array of supporting arms, including Joint and Aviation fires.**

Associated Additive Capabilities:

- **Provide technical and tactical expertise for planning Joint and Marine fires, including air fires. (Existing capability pushed to the Plt & Sqd levels)**
- **Provide technical and tactical expertise for integrating Joint and Marine fires, including air fires. (Existing capability pushed to the Plt level)**
- **Provide technical and tactical expertise for executing (including designating targets for) Joint and Marine fires, including air fires. (Existing capability pushed to the Plt & Sqd levels)**

Intel / Battlespace Awareness

DO Mission Analysis:

- **The human dimension is important to small units in making positive identification and determining intent.**
- **Units require enhanced capabilities to collect, report, and exploit intelligence.**
- **Small units require the capability to employ, direct and monitor unmanned air & ground vehicles.**

Associated Additive Capabilities:

- **The capability to communicate & interact with indigenous personnel, along with the capability to manipulate and exploit indigenous personnel. (New capabilities for Bn to Sqd levels)**
- **The ability to collect, process and disseminate all-source actionable intelligence (to include engineer recon). (Existing capability pushed to the company level)**
- **The ability to collect, assess, and act upon combat information (New capability pushed to Plt to Sqd levels)**
- **Small units require the capability to employ, direct and monitor unmanned air & ground vehicles in order to receive and transmit responsive persistent real-time imagery and data ISO ongoing and planned operations. (UAV: Existing capability pushed to the Plt & Sqd levels / UGV: New capability for Bn to Sqd levels)**

Logistics

DO Mission Analysis:

- **Small units require the means to provide mobile electric power by advanced means in order to power communications systems.**
- **Supply Support is capable of being remotely delivered.**

Associated Additive Capabilities:

- **The ability to provide organic power for the breadth of GCE systems related to operations, command and control, intelligence, fires and logistics. (Existing capability pushed to the Co to Sqd levels)**
- **The ability to provide a common power source for all man portable communications devices. (New capability for Bn to Sqd levels)**
- **The ability to conduct rapid tailorable resupply to replenish all classes of supply by ground, aerial and waterborne means. To include FARP's/RRP's/TLZ's, Water Production/Purification/Distribution, & Fuel Storage/Distribution. (New capability for Bn to Sqd levels)**
- **The ability to triage and stabilize casualties for CASEVAC. (Existing capability pushed to the Co to Sqd levels)**

Command & Control

DO Mission Analysis:

- **Commanders require a robust and resilient network that enables distributed decision-making and enhances command and feedback.**
- **The command and control network provides OTH, OTM, BLOS communications assets connecting commanders to distributed units.**
- **Small units require the ability to conduct collaborative and decentralized planning.**
- **Small units require access to the common operational picture that is scalable to support local operations.**
- **New fire support coordination measures and procedures must be developed to account for unique battlefield geometries.**

Associated Additive Capabilities:

- **The ability to transmit and receive voice, data, and imagery, over-the-horizon and on-the-move (to include the fire support network). (New capability for Bn to Sqd levels)**
- **The ability to conduct collaborative planning among higher, adjacent and supporting commands. (New capability for Co to Sqd levels)**
- **Provide the GCE a common operational picture at all tactical levels. (New capability for Bn to Sqd levels)**
- **The ability to conduct fire support planning, coordination and execution while maintaining operational tempo (i.e. FSCC). (Existing capability pushed to the Co level)**

Force Protection

DO Mission Analysis:

- **Provide the ability to rapidly harden positions with minimal manpower.**
- **Small units will require organic surface mobility to move rapidly and maintain positional advantage relative to the enemy or enhance force protection measures.**

Associated Additive Capabilities:

- **Protected Tactical Mobility for sustained operations ashore. (New capability for Bn to Sqd levels)**

IBEPP: Inherent Limitations

- **<u>Manpower</u>. BLUF: Enlisted staffing is still based on a stabilization or "lock on" date (e.g., currently D-150 for all deploying battalions) vice a post-deployment return date.**
- **Staffing of 1/5 at D-270 is a "one-time" effort that cannot be sustained.**
- **<u>Training</u>. BLUF: School houses have limited flexibility when feeding deploying units due to annual class schedules.**
  - **42 fixed SOI graduations throughout the year (~21 per SOI) drive the flow of newly-joined entry-level infantrymen.**
  - **4 fixed IOC graduations per year drive the arrival of infantry Lieutenants.**
  - **1 fixed EWS graduation per year drives the arrival of post-CLS infantry Captains .**
  - **Preponderance of officers/SNCO's PCS during the summer**

Current manpower assignment limitations and fixed school graduation dates do not support a narrow post-deployment personnel fill window envisioned for officers/SNCOs/Sgts under the original IBEPP concept.

IBEPP Way Ahead

- **<u>Feb 07:</u> Deliver new equipment sets to the SOI's for use by instructional staff**
- **<u>Mar 07</u>: Begin the IBEPP for 1/5**
- **<u>Spring 07</u> (date TBD): Begin the IBEPP for 1/9**
- **Develop east coast schedule for follow-on battalions in**

  FY-07(West coast schedule complete)
- **Complete additional staffing increase at SOI East and West in order to standup second MTC on each coast**

Time-In-Service (TIS) Constraints

48 month Enlistment Contract

D-180 (Jan 08)



CPG End State of 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio achievable w/ 27 infantry battalions (average dwell time of ~14 months). However, moving pre-deployment lock-on date to > D-180 may preclude many infantrymen from completing a minimum of two deployments without cross-decking.

D-360



DO Implementation Challenges

TIME TO TRAIN is the greatest challenge:

- Within formal school curricula
- Within Pre-deployment training continuum (1:1.5 TAR or less for Inf Bns)
- Within manpower management system (e.g., TIS/TOS constraints)

- In order to fully implement the DO concept as articulated in the 2005 Concept Paper, the small unit leader will need to possess much increased skills in:
  - Employment of supporting ar
  - Command and control
  - Logistical sustainment
  - Decentralized decision makin

The current Infantry Battalion Mission Essential Task List (METL) in the Infantry T&R Manual (NAVMC 3500.87) is already very extensive -- DO further expands METLs.

- CNA Study – USMC needs a holistic reconsideration of manpower management policies that will support assignment of 0311 sergeants as a rifle squad leaders during their 5th through 7th year of service following previous 3-4 year infantry battalion assignment.